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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4) (2002), transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Consequently, the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with 
jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2) (j) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of the Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to request jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of 
possession of controlled substance precursors and attempt. To 
make such a showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel 
rendered a deficient performance, falling below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that 
counsel's performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 
803 (Utah 1988) . The appellate court reviews such a claim as a 
matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1|20, 984 P.2d 376; 
State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, fl2, 65 P. 3d 648, cert, granted, 
76 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003) . 
Mr. Terry also asserts this issue by way of plain error. In 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court 
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outlined the following principles involved in determining whether 
"plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, %5, 37 P.3d 
1099 (citing State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164). 
Preservation of Issue or Statement of Grounds for Review 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule inasmuch as such 
claims may be raised for the first time on appeal. This issue is 
also being raised for the first time on appeal by way of plain 
error, which likewise constitutes an exception to the preservation 
rule. 
2. Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel and the trial court committed plain error by failing to 
accurately instruct the jury concerning the law and elements of 
the charges. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must first show that counsel rendered a deficient 
performance that fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was 
prejudicial. Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988). Such a 
claim is reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 
32, f20, 984 P.2d 376; State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, fl2, 65 
P.3d 648, cert, granted, 16 P.3d 691 (Utah 2003) . 
In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme 
Court outlined the following principles involved in determining 
whether "plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, ^5, 37 P.3d 
1099 (citing State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and plain error constitute exceptions to the preservation rule and 
therefore may be raised for the first time on appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law, whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim or by copy, with the appropriate citation, in 
the body and arguments or addenda of the instant Brief of 
Appellant. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
This case involves critical questions concerning, among other 
critical matters, the failure to request jury instructions on the 
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance 
precursors and an attempt to commit the charged crimes or the 
lesser included offenses. In this case, trial counsel failed to 
request jury instructions and the trial court failed to provide 
instructions that would have provided a rational basis for the 
jury to donvict Defendant of the lesser included offenses. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Counts 1 and 2), both 
first-degree felonies, one count of Failure to Respond to 
Officer's Signal to Stop (Count 3), a third-degree felony, and one 
count of Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon (Count 4), a class 
B misdemeanor. Defendant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. 
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On November 13, 2001, the parties appeared for a jury trial. 
The jury found Defendant guilty of all charges. 
Defense counsel subsequently filed various motions, which the 
trial court denied. On September 9, 2002, the trial court 
sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term of five years to life 
on Counts 1 and 2, an indeterminate term of zero to five years on 
Count 3, and six months in the Davis County Jail on Count 4, to be 
served concurrently. Defense counsel filed a Motion for New Trial 
On September 23, 2002, to which the State responded in opposition. 
The trial court denied the Motion for New Trial on February 25, 
2003. 
On September 15, 2003, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a Rule 
65B Motion for Resentencing, requesting nunc pro tunc resentencing 
due to his counsel's failure to perfect an appeal. The trial 
court, on February 24, 2004, granted the Motion and resentenced 
Defendant, imposing the same sentence previously imposed on 
September 9, 2002. Defendant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on 
March 23, 2004. 
On May 19, 2 004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4). Pursuant to Defendant's request, the trial court 
appointed the undersigned as appellate counsel for purposes of the 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Terry was charged with two counts of Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Counts 1 and 2) , both 
first-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 
and 58-37d-5, one count of Failure to Respond to Officer's Signal 
to Stop (Count 3) , a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5, and one count of Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon (Count 4), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504(1) (R. 68-70). See Information / 
Complaint for Forfeiture, R. 68-70, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
2. Mr. Terry pleaded not guilty to all charges (R. 48-49). 
3. The parties appeared for a jury trial on November 13, 
2001 (R. 115-19). 
4. After deliberating, the jury found Mr. Terry guilty on 
all charges (R. 601:254:13-19). 
5. On April 11, 2002, defense counsel filed a Motion to 
Dismiss or for New Trial (R. 171-83). 
6. On May 8, 2002, the State filed a memorandum in 
opposition to Mr. Terry's Motion (R. 188-229). 
7. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial 
court ruled, among other things, that the Motion for a new trial 
was untimely (R. 242-44) . 
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8. On June 28, 2002, defense counsel asserted essentially 
the same theories previously raised in the form of a Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment (R. 2 55-66). 
9. The State again responded in opposition (R. 270-73). 
10. On August 27, 2002, the trial court issued its Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion for Arrest of Judgment, denying the Motion for 
Arrest of Judgment (R. 2 92-309). 
11. On September 9, 2002, the trial court sentenced Mr. 
Terry to an indeterminate term of five years to life on Counts 1 
and 2, an indeterminate term of zero to five years on Count 3, and 
six months in the Davis County Jail on Count 4, to be served 
concurrently (R. 331; R. 347-49). 
12. On September 23, 2002, defense counsel filed a Motion 
for New Trial (R. 354-55). 
13. The State responded in opposition (R. 359-404). 
14. On February 25, 2003, the trial court denied the Motion 
for New Trial (R. 515-16) . 
15. On September 15, 2003, Mr. Terry, pro se, filed 
Defendant's Rule 65B Motion for Resentencing, requesting nunc pro 
tunc resentencing due to his counsel's failure to perfect an 
appeal (R. 521-34). 
16. The State opposed Mr. Terry's Rule 65B Motion (R. 542-
44) . 
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17. On February 24, 2 004, the trial court held a hearing on 
the Rule 65B Motion for Resentencing (R. 558) . During that 
hearing, the State agreed to a resentencing to begin the appeal 
time running again (R. 559) . 
18. That same day, the trial court resentenced Mr. Terry, 
imposing the same sentence previously imposed on September 9, 2002 
(R. 560). See Second Amended Judgment and Commitment to the Utah 
State Prison, R. 560, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum B. 
19. On March 23, 2004, Mr. Terry filed a pro se Notice of 
Appeal (R. 565-67). See Notice of Appeal, R. 565-67, a true and 
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
20. On May 19, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court transferred the 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2 (4) . 
21. Pursuant to the request of Mr. Terry, the trial court 
appointed the undersigned as appellate counsel for purposes of the 
appeal (R. 591-92). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Trial counsel denied Mr. Terry of the Sixth Amendment 
right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to request 
jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of possession of 
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controlled substance precursors, including the attempt to commit 
the charged crimes. In this case, not only is there is a close 
relationship between the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment and possession of controlled substance 
precursors, but there also is significant overlap in the elements 
of each offense. 
Further, the evidence presented during trial provided a 
rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced 
crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and 
then convict him of a lesser included offense of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor had those particular instructions 
been given. The jury could have rationally found under the 
circumstances of this case that Mr. Terry merely possessed, if 
that, the controlled substance precursors of iodine and/or 
pseudoephedrine. 
Trial counsel also failed to request a jury instruction 
concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to commit the crime of either 
the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors. 
Under the facts of this case, the jury could have rationally found 
that Mr. Terry's alleged solicitation of Mr. Archibald to purchase 
the controlled substance precursors actually constituted an 
attempt. 
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Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the 
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance 
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. But 
for counsel's deficient performance of failing to request a lesser 
included offense instruction, Mr. Terry would not have been 
convicted of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment. 
Additionally, the trial court plainly erred by failing to 
charge the jury with respect to the previously discussed lesser 
included offenses. The record demonstrates that there is a 
rational basis in the instant case for a verdict acquitting Mr. 
Terry of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors 
and/or equipment and then convicting him of a lesser included 
offense of possession of a controlled substance precursor. 
2. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel 
and the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately 
instruct the jury concerning the law and elements of the charges. 
The failure of trial counsel to object to the constructive 
possession instruction fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment in light of existing Utah case 
law and the underlying factual circumstances of this case. But 
for counsel's deficient performance, Mr. Terry would not have been 
10 
convicted of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment. 
The trial court committed plain error by failing to 
accurately instruct the jury on the law of constructive possession 
as it applied to the facts of the case. Further, the error 
concerning constructive possession should have been obvious in 
light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's 
duty to accurately instruct the jury and a defendant's right to 
have his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and 
understandable way. Finally, the error that resulted was harmful 
because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately considering 
the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the case. 
Trial counsel also failed to request a jury instruction that 
accurately defined the conspiracy element. Moreover, trial 
counsel failed to request that a special verdict form be utilized 
by the jury so that Mr. Terry could determine the variation relied 
upon by the jury to convict him of Clandestine Laboratory 
Precursors and/or Equipment. Trial counsel's failures fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, which 
is demonstrated by existing Utah case law, statutory criteria, and 
the underlying factual circumstances of this case. But for 
counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would have been 
different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been convicted of 
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the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment, as a first-degree felony. 
Additionally, the trial court plainly erred by failing to 
accurately instruct the jury concerning conspiracy as an element 
of the crimes charged, which was obvious in light of prior Utah 
case law, statutory criteria, and rules concerning a trial court's 
duty to accurately instruct the jury on the applicable law. This 
error was harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and 
accurately considering the law as it pertained to the facts of the 
case as well as requiring the jury to disclose the variation 
relied upon in the course of convicting Mr. Terry. 
The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury 
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of 
the element of intent fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by Utah 
case law, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6, and the underlying factual 
circumstances of the case. But for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr. 
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment. 
The trial court committed plain error by failing to 
completely and accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the legal element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II 
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of the Information. This error was obvious in light Utah case law 
and rules concerning a trial court's duty. The resulting error 
was harmful because it precluded the jury from completely and 
accurately considering all the elements of the charges set forth 
in Count I and II of the Information. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. TERRY OF HIS SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES 
OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
PRECURSOR. 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that w[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); accord State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). " [T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel 
is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it 
has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial." 
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842, 
(1993) . 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
"
xidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
xshow that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 2064 
(footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome the strong 
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and 
exercised reasonable professional judgment." State v. Bullock, 
791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 
S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. In the course of this 
determination, the appellate court ''should consider the totality 
of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the 
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated 
effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." 
Templin, 805 P.2d at 187. 
B. Lesser Included Offenses Instructions 
Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the 
lesser included offenses of possession of a controlled substance 
precursor as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12)(k), 58-
37c-19(2), and 58-37c-20(l) fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
1-402(3) and (4), and the underlying factual circumstances of this 
case. 
According to State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), and 
subsequent case law,2 a lesser included offense instruction must 
2The subsequent cases include State v. Smith, 700 P. 2d 1106 (Utah 
1985); State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984); State v. Oldroyd, 
685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984); State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984); 
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be given if (1) the statutory elements of greater and lesser 
included offenses overlap to some degree, and (2) the evidence 
provides a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant 
of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." See id. at 159 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4)); 
see also State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, f23, 61 P.3d 1019; State v. 
Evans, 2001 UT 22, fl8, 20 P.3d 888; State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 
421, 424 (Utah 1986) . In the course of making this determination, 
the court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the 
defendant. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 449, 453 (Utah 1986); see 
also State v. Spillers, 2005 UT App 283, Kl3 . Furthermore, " [t]he 
requirements . . . for the inclusion of a lesser included offense 
instruction requested by the defendant should be liberally 
construed." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. 
The elements of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory 
precursors and/or equipment, the crime with which Mr. Terry was 
charged and convicted, are contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-3 7d-
4(1) (a) and 58-37d-5(l) (a),3 which state as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly or intentionally . . . possess a 
controlled substance precursor with the 
State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983); and State v. Crick, 675 
P.2d 527 (Utah 1983). 
3A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37d-4 (2002) and 58-37d-5 (2002) 
are attached hereto as Addendum D. 
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intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-
4(1) (a) . . . is guilty of a first degree 
felony if the trier of fact also finds any 
one of the following conditions occurred in 
conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; . . . . 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation . . . .4 
The elements of possession of a controlled substance precursor are 
alternatively set forth at Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37c-3(12) (k) , 58-
370-19(2), and 58-37C-20 (1) ,5 which state: 
"Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 
58-1-501 includes knowingly and intentionally 
. . . obtaining or attempting to obtain or to 
possess any controlled substance precursor or 
any combination of controlled substance 
precursors knowing or having a reasonable 
cause to believe that the controlled 
substance precursor is intended to be used in 
the unlawful manufacture of any controlled 
substance.6 
* * * * 
Any person who is not licensed to engage 
in regulated transactions and not excepted 
from licensure is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor who, under circumstances not 
4Without the possession-of-firearm condition, the charge of 
possession of a controlled substance precursor is a second-degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4(2) (2002). 
5A copy of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37C-3 (12) (2002), 58-37c-19 
(2002), and 58-37c-20 (2002) is attached hereto as Addendum E. 
6A violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) is a second-
degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-ll(2) (2002). 
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amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-
37c-3(12) (k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1) (a) : 
(a) possesses more than two ounces of 
crystal iodine; or 
(b) offers to sell, sells, or 
distributes crystal iodine to 
another. 
• * * * 
Any person who is not licensed to engage 
in regulated transactions and not excepted 
from licensure who, under circumstances not 
amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-
37c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(1)(a), 
possesses more than 12 grams of ephedrine or 
pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or 
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of 
these substances, is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
According to Baker, an offense is included in a greater 
offense when there is "some relationship" between them and "some 
overlap" in the proof that is required to establish the elements 
of both offenses. See State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 117, 116 (Utah 
1986) (citing State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96 (Utah 1983)). In this 
case, not only is there is a close relationship between the 
enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors, but 
there also is significant overlap in the elements of each offense. 
Further, the second part of the Baker test is satisfied in 
the instant case. The evidence presented during trial provided a 
rational basis for the jury to acquit Mr. Terry of the enhanced 
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crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and 
then convict him of a lesser included offense of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor had those particular instructions 
been given (R. 601:24-35; R. 601:82-92; R. 601:115-30). On the 
facts before it, the jury could have rationally found under the 
circumstances of this case that Mr. Terry, at best, merely 
possessed the controlled substance precursors of iodine and/or 
pseudoephedrine (See id.). Cf. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 127, 
989 P.2d 1065. 
Trial counsel likewise failed to request a jury instruction 
concerning the attempt of Mr. Terry to commit the crime of either 
the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment and possession of controlled substance precursors. 
According to Utah law, "a person is guilty of an attempt to commit 
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct 
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (2002). Under the facts of the 
instant case, the jury could have rationally found that Mr. 
Terry's alleged solicitation of Mr. Archibald to purchase the 
controlled substance precursors actually constituted an attempt.7 
7According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (2002) , a criminal 
attempt to commit a crime results in a one-step reduction of the 
charged crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(2) and (5). 
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Trial counsel's failure to request jury instructions on the 
lesser included offenses of possession of controlled substance 
precursors and the attempt to commit the alleged crimes fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment in light 
of existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah Code Ann, §§ 
76-1-402(3) and (4) , Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101, and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case. But for counsel's deficient 
performance of failing to request a lesser included offense 
instruction, Mr. Terry would not have been convicted of the 
enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment. 
C. Plain Error 
In addition to ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial 
court committed plain error by failing to charge the jury with 
respect to the aforementioned lesser included offenses. The Utah 
Supreme Court, in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993), 
outlined the following principles involved in determining whether 
"plain error" exists: 
In general, to establish the existence of 
plain error and to obtain appellate relief 
from an alleged error that was not properly 
objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
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the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
Id. at 1208-09; see also State v. Roth, 2001 UT 103, f5, 37 P.3d 
1099 (citing State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, %9, 9 P.3d 164); State 
v. Portillo, 914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v. 
Tenney, 913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
The trial court plainly erred by failing to charge the jury 
with respect to the previously discussed lesser included offenses. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2002), the trial court 
is not "obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense." (Emphasis added). 
There is a rational basis in the instant case for a verdict 
acquitting Mr. Terry of the enhanced crime of possession of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment and then 
convicting him of a lesser included offense of possession of a 
controlled substance precursor. The record demonstrates that Mr. 
Terry was neither in actual nor constructive possession of the 
controlled substance precursors (R. 601::24-35; R. 601:82-92; R. 
601:115-30). Moreover, Mr. Terry was never in possession of any 
clandestine drug lab equipment (R. 601:204-18; cf. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37d-6 (2002)) . 
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This error should have been obvious in light of prior case 
law, statutory language, and various rules concerning a trial 
court's obligation and a defendant's right to a lesser-included-
offense charge when such a rational basis exists. Moreover, the 
resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from 
duly considering the lesser included offenses. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO ACCURATELY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE LAW AND ELEMENTS OF 
THE CHARGES. 
Mr. Terry incorporates the statements of the law and legal 
citations pertaining to the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel previously set forth in Argument I. In 
addition, Mr. Terry incorporates the statements of law and legal 
citations pertaining to plain error, which are also set forth in 
Argument I. 
As a matter of well-settled law, no person accused of a crime 
in this country may be convicted of a crime unless each element of 
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970). Utah law 
requires the jury to be instructed with respect to all the legal 
elements that it must find to convict a defendant of the crime so 
charged. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991). The 
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absence of such an instruction is reversible error as a matter of 
law. Id. (citing State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)). 
"The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error." State v. Roberts, 111 P.2d 235, 
239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine, 618 P.2d at 35) ; see also State v. 
Harmon, 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State v. 
Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1252 (Utah 1984) . "Thus, the failure to 
give this instruction can never be harmless error." Jones, 823 
P.2d at 1061. 
A. Constructive Possession Instruction 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by 
failing to object to Instruction No. 33,8 which was utilized to 
instruct the jury concerning constructive possession. According 
to Utah law, to prove constructive possession there must be a 
"sufficient nexus" between the accused and the controlled 
substance precursors to permit an inference that the accused had 
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the controlled substance precursors. See State v. Layman, 
1999 UT 79, Kl3, 985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 
319 (Utah 1985)). In other words, to show constructive possession 
8A true and correct copy of Jury Instruction No. 33 (R. 100) is 
attached hereto as Addendum F. 
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in the instant case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the controlled substance precursors "were subject to 
the defendant's dominion and control and the defendant had the 
intent to exercise that control." Id. at fl6 (citing Fox, 709 
P.2d at 318) . 
According to the evidence presented in the instant case, no 
one but the police took possession, either actual or constructive, 
of the controlled substance precursors (R. 601:37-38; R. 601:129-
30) . Indisputably, the police in the instant case at all relevant 
times had direct custody, dominion, and control of the controlled 
substance precursors over which Mr. Terry allegedly had 
constructive possession. Consequently, the State, as a matter of 
impossibility, could not have proven that Mr. Terry constructively 
possessed the controlled substance precursors. At the very most, 
the factual circumstances of the case constituted an alleged 
constructive possession or an alleged conspiracy to possess the 
controlled substance precursors. 
The failure of trial counsel to object to Instruction No. 33 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment in light of existing Utah case law and the underlying 
factual circumstances of this case.9 But for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different in that Mr. 
9See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). 
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Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment. 
"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." See State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 
(Utah 1981) ). 1 0 Based upon established principles of plain error, 
the trial court committed plain error by failing to accurately 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
The error concerning constructive possession should have been 
obvious in light of prior Utah case law and rules concerning a 
trial court's duty and a defendant's right "to have his theory of 
the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." 
Potter, 627 P. 2d at 78. Further, the error that resulted was 
harmful because it precluded the jury from duly and accurately 
considering the law as it pertained to the underlying facts of the 
case. 
B, Conspiracy Instruction 
For the jury to convict Mr. Terry of Clandestine Laboratory 
Precursors and/or Equipment as set forth in Counts I and II of the 
Information, the jury had to find that the State had proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry " [k]nowingly or intentionally; 
. . . [p]ossessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent 
10See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(a). 
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to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; AND/OR . 
[c]onspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation . . . ." (R. 92-94) -11 According to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-201 (2002) , "a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, 
intending that conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees 
with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of 
the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy . . . ." 
Trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction that 
accurately defined the conspiracy element as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-201. Moreover, trial counsel failed to request 
that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury so that Mr. 
Terry, as the accused, could determine which variation the jury 
relied upon in the course of convicting him of Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment. 
In State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1073, the State 
charged the defendant with unlawful clandestine laboratory 
operations, which included multiple variations of statutory 
criteria for conviction. Id. at 1(27. However, because no special 
verdict form was utilized, the Court determined that it was 
possible that the jury relied upon the subsection that includes 
1:LA true and correct copy of Jury Instructions Nos. 28 and 29 (R. 
92-94) are attached hereto as Addendum G. 
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all the elements for conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance precursor as a lesser included offense. Id. 
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for 
precursor possession. See id. 
Trial counsel's failure to propose a jury instruction that 
accurately defined the conspiracy element and the failure to 
request that a special verdict form be utilized by the jury fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment. 
This is demonstrated by existing Utah case law, statutory 
criteria, and the underlying factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would have 
been different inasmuch as Mr. Terry would not have been convicted 
of the enhanced crime of clandestine laboratory precursors and/or 
equipment as a first-degree felony. Had a special verdict form 
been requested and utilized, Mr. Terry would have been provided 
with notice of the variation relied upon by the jury in the course 
of convicting him under Counts I and II of the Information. In 
the event that the jury had relied upon the conspiracy variation, 
which would have been revealed by way of the special verdict form, 
the conviction would have been reduced to a second-degree felony 
or one classification pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-202(2) 
(2002) . 
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"A trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law 
applicable to the facts of the case." See State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (citing State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 
(Utah 1981)) . Based upon established principles of plain error, 
the trial court plainly erred by failing to accurately instruct 
the jury on the law applicable to the facts of the case. 
The error concerning conspiracy as an element of the crimes 
charged was obvious in light of prior Utah case law, statutory 
criteria, and rules concerning a trial court's duty to accurately 
instruct the jury on the applicable law. See Potter, 627 P.2d at 
78. This error was harmful because it precluded the jury from 
duly and accurately considering the law as it pertained to the 
facts of the case as well as requiring the jury to disclose the 
variation relied upon in the course of arriving at the 
convictions. 
C. Intent Instruction 
As previously discussed, before the jury could convict Mr. 
Terry of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment as set 
forth in Counts I and II of the Information, it had to find that 
the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Terry 
u[k]nowingly or intentionally; . . . [p] ossessed a controlled 
substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation; AND/OR . . . [c]onspired with or aided 
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another to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation . . . ." 
(R. 92-94). Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002) specifically 
designates the circumstances under which the jury, as the trier of 
fact, may infer that a defendant intended to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation. That provision states: 
The trier of fact may infer that the 
defendant intended to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation if the defendant: 
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled 
substance precursor; or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to 
illegally possess a controlled substance 
precursor and is in possession of any one of 
the following pieces of equipment: 
(a) glass reaction vessel; 
(b) separatory funnel; 
(c) glass condenser; 
(d) analytical balance; or 
(e) heating mantle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6 (2002). 
The failure of trial counsel to object to the proposed jury 
instructions as an incomplete and thereby inaccurate statement of 
the elements and relevant law fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, which is demonstrated existing 
Utah case law, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-6, and the underlying 
factual circumstances of the case. But for counsel's deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different inasmuch as Mr. 
Terry would not have been convicted of the enhanced crime of 
clandestine laboratory precursors and/or equipment. This is 
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particularly applicable in light of the foregoing ineffective 
assistance of counsel and plain error arguments. 
According to Utah law, the jury must be instructed as to all 
the legal elements that it must find to convict a defendant of the 
crime so charged -- the absence of which is reversible error. 
State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) (citing State v. 
Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980)); see also State v. Roberts, 
111 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 1985) (stating that "[t]he general rule is 
that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense 
is essential."). The trial court plainly erred by failing to 
completely and accurately instruct the jury on the law applicable 
to the legal element of intent as it pertained to Counts I and II 
of the Information. 
This error was obvious in light of the trial court's 
obligation to so instruct the jury, which is well-established by 
Utah case law and rules concerning a trial court's duty. The 
resulting error was harmful because it precluded the jury from 
completely and accurately considering all the elements of the 
charges set forth in Count I and II of the Information. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Terry respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case to the 
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trial court for a new trial or, in the alternative, that this 
Court reverse Mr. Terry's convictions and enter judgment for the 
lesser included offenses together with any relief the Court deems 
just and appropriate under the circumstances of the case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of July, 2005. 
'ARNOLDVV I G G I N S / p • c • 
^Scott L tffigginfs 
At to^f i^ys f o ^ J ^ p ^ l l a n t 
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I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be mailed by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following on this 12th day of July, 2005: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake Cit7>sJJTC 84XL4-0854 
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Exhibit A 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P. O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Fartnington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





FOR FORFEITURE ^ 
OTN 12259776 f^Q^A 
The undersigned officer states on information and belief that the defendant, on or 
about March 21, 2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah, committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
CLANDESTI>ffiLABORATORYPRECURSORSAND/OREQUIPMENT(58-37d-
4 and 58-37d-5), a first degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, 
as a party, knowingly or intentionally (A) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; (B) conspired with or aided another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; and in so doing possessed a firearm. 
COUNT 2 
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT (58-3 7d-
4 and 58-37d-5), a first degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant, 
as a party, knowingly or intentionally (A) possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent 
to engage in a clandestine laboratory operation; (B) conspired with or aided another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; and in so doing possessed a firearm. 
COUNT 3 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICERS SIGNAL TO STOP (41-6-13.5), a third 
degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did operate a motor 
vehicle and, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a 
stop, did operate his vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or 
endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or did attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means. 
COUNT 4 
CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON (76-10-504(1)), a class B 
misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid, the defendant did carry a concealed 
dangerous weapon, (A) which was not a firearm on his person or one that was readily accessible for 
immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this part, in a place other than his 
residence, property, or business under his control; or (B) which was a firearm that contained no 
ammunition without a valid concealed firearm permit. 
COUNT 5 
NOTICE OF SEIZURE AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO FORFEIT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-13, et seq., that 
the following property was seized on or about March 21, 2001, incident to an arrest of defendant, 
to wit: 1997 Chevy Camaro bearing VIN #2G1FP22P9V2152515 and license plate 10-MYSS 
registered to Robert Terry and Fourteen Thousand Four Dollars and 50/100 Dollars ($14,004.50) 
in U.S. Currency. 
NOTICE IS FURTHER GIVEN that the State of Utah intends to seek the forfeiture 
of the said seized 1997 Chevy Camaro bearing VIN #2G1FP22P9V2152515 and license plate 10-
/ <? 
MYSS registered to Robert Terry and Fourteen Thousand Four Dollars and 50/100 Dollars 
($14,004.50) in U.S. Currency, and to forfeit and confiscate any right, title or interest that defendant 
may claim to have in and to said property. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Jeff Jensen. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned officer has received 
information from the investigating officer, Jeff Jensen of the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, and 
the Information herein is based upon such personal observations and investigation of said officer. 
1. On March 22, 2001, defendant provided Jeffery Archibald $ 11,800 in cash for the 
purchase of chemical precursors. Agents working for the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force, met 
with Mr. Archibald who then used the money to purchase 10 pounds of iodine and four cases of 
pseudoephedrine. 
2. At the time of the above transaction, defendant was driving a 1997 Chevy Camaro. 
When officers attempted to stop defendant, he fled the area and a chase ensued 
3. In addition to the $11,800 that defendant used to purchase the above chemicals, 
$2,204.50 in cash was found in defendant's possession. Because the 1997 Chevy Camaro and the 
cash could easily be disposed of, hidden or transported out of State, they were seized without a 
warrant. 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this **•"«-> day of / / / OtSH^ , 2001 A?  of _ y f f i ^ V ^ 1 
Authorized March 23, 2001, 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Deputy Davis/County 
A felony of the first degree carries a possible maximum penalty of five years to life imprisonment 
and/or up to $10,000 fine. Conviction of a drug-related offense requires immediate suspension of 
defendant's drivers license for six months under Utah Code Annotated. 53-3-220(1 )(c). 
Exhibit B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE (J)F U m 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
pf EB 2 4 ?004 I 
SECOND 
DISTniCT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
ROBERT CARL TERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
AND COMMITMENT TO THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON 
Case No. 011700517 
That whereas said defendant, having been convicted at trial on Count 1 and 2 to the 
crimes of Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (58-37d-4 and 58-37d-5), 
felonies of the 1st degree, Count 3 Fail to Stop/Respond at Command of Police Officer, a 
Felony of the 3rd degree, and Count 4 to Carrying Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, and now being present in Court and now being present in Court accompanied by 
his attorney and ready for sentence, thereupon the Court renders its judgment. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison on Counts 1 and 2 for an 
indeterminate term of 5 years to life in each count, Count 3 for an indeterminate term of 0-5 
years, Count 4 to 6 months in the Davis County Jail, may be served at the Utah State Prison. 
Court recommendations: The Court recommends that each count run concurrent with 
the other. Please notify Judges Michael G. Allphin, Glen R. Dawson, and Prosecutor Michael 
Direda immediately if Defendant is to be released from the Utah State Prison. 
Dated September 9, 2002, with the Seal of the Court affixed hereto. 
BY THE COURT: 
'/<§/ STATE \ ^ \ \ 
OF !«=>?* 
^U-i$x' 
District Court Judge 
£/2!rAW 
ALYSON BROWN 
Clerk of Court 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
'KARI ROBERT L TERRY, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 011700517 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Defendant, appearing pro se, hereby submits the following NOTICE OF APPEAL 
pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1. Party Taking Appeal: Defendant, Robert Terry. 
2. Judgment or Order: Judgment of Conviction (1) Clandestine 
Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Section 58-37d-4(a)(e) and 58-37d-
5(a); (2) Clandestine Laboratory Precursors and/or Equipment (Section 58-37d-
4(a)(e) and 58-37d-5(a); (3) Failure to Respond to an Officer's Signal to Stop 
(Section 41-6-13.5); and (4) Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon (Section 
76-10-504(1). Convicted after jury trial on November 13, 2002. Re-sentenced by 
Judge Allphm on February 23, 2004 as follows: two sentences of 5 to life; one 
sentence of 0-5. 
3. Court from which appeal is taken: Second District Court, Davis County, 
Judge Allphin. 
4. Court to which appeal is taken: Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated: /tinted / < - , 2004 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Robert £arl Terry ' 
Pro Se Defendant 
Sl<f 
Certificate of Mailing 
The undersigned hereby represents that on __3 ~ ID 2004,1 mailed a true 
copy of the attached Notice of Appeal, first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Mike Direda 
Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, UT 84025 
NOfARY PUBLIC 
ROSE MARIE VAN DYKE 
2^5 E 300 N 
PO BOX 898 
GUNNISON UT 84634 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
FEBRUARY 14 2006 
S l A l t OFUTAH 
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CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT 58-37d-4 
(c) "Controlled substance precursor" means those chemicals designated 
in Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled Substance Precursor Act, except those 
substances designated in Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(kk) and (11). 
(d) "Disposal" means the abandonment, discharge, deposit, injection, 
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any hazardous or dangerous 
material into or on any property, land or water so that the material may 
enter the environment, be emitted into the air, or discharged into any 
waters, including groundwater. 
(e) "Hazardous or dangerous material" means any substance which 
because of its quantity, concentration, physical characteristics, or chemical 
characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in 
mortality, an increase in serious illness, or may pose a substantial present 
or potential future hazard to human health or the environment when 
improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise improp-
erly managed. 
(f) "Illegal manufacture of specified controlled substances" means in 
violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act, the: 
(i) compounding, synthesis, concentration, purification, separation, 
extraction, or other physical or chemical processing for the purpose of 
producing methamphetamine, other amphetamine compounds as 
listed in Schedule I of the Utah Controlled Substances Act, phency-
clidine, narcotic analgesic analogs as listed in Schedule I of the Utah 
Controlled Substances Act, lysergic acid diethylamide, mescaline; 
(ii) conversion of cocaine or methamphetamine to their base forms; 
or 
(iii) extraction, concentration, or synthesis of marijuana as that 
drug is defined in Section 58-37-2. 
(2) Unless otherwise specified, the definitions in Section 58-37-2 also apply 
to this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-3, enacted by L. substituted "Controlled Substance Precursor 
1992, ch. 156, § 3; 1993, ch. 4, § 95; 1997, ch. Act" for "Controlled Substances Precursor Act" 
64, § 10; 2000, ch. 272, § 5. and "Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(kk) and (11)" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- "Subsections 58-37c-3(2)(gg) and (2)(hh) " 
ment, effective May 1, 2000, m Subsection (l)(c) 
58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage 
in a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory 
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to 
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distrib-
uted or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation; 
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; 
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(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or 
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized 
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or 
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the 
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or 
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person 
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within 
this state or any other location. 
(2) A person who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second 
degree felony. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-4, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
1992, ch. 156, § 4; 1997, ch. 64, § 11. mes, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Lesser included offense. stance precursor as a lesser included offense of 
Because no special verdict form was used, operating a methamphetamine laboratory 
and because it was possible that the jury relied State v Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 989 P2d 1065 
upon Subsection (l)(a) in reaching its verdict, Possession of methamphetamine in violation 
which includes all the elements for conviction of of § 58-37-8 was not a lesser included offense of 
possession of a controlled substance precursor, possession of equipment or supplies with intent 
the defendant was entitled to reversal of his to engage m a clandestine laboratory operation 
conviction for possession of a controlled sub- State v Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P3d 1099 
58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony. 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (l)(a) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-5, enacted by L. merit, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or was 
1992, ch. 156, § 5; 1997, ch. 64, § 12; 1998, conducted in the presence of" after "involved" in 
ch. 65, § 1; 2000, ch. 187, § 1. Subsection (l)(e) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, 
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deleted former Subsection (l)(e), which con- Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
cerned clandestine drug laboratory operations nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301 
involving or conducted in the presence of per-
sons under 18. A similar provision was enacted 
as Section 76-5-112.5. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Possession of methamphetamme in violation 
c*x § 58-37-8 was not a lesser included offense of 
Lesser included offenses. possession of equipment or supplies with intent 
Sufficiency of evidence
 t o e n g a g e m a c l a n d e s t m e laboratory operation. 
Lesser included offenses. State v Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P.3d 1099. 
Because no special verdict form was used, 
and because it was possible that the jury relied Sufficiency of evidence. 
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a) in reaching its Where the defendant did not acknowledge, 
verdict, which includes all the elements for let alone marshal, the evidence presented at 
conviction of possession of a controlled sub- trial, but described only fragmented portions of 
stance precursor, the defendant was entitled to the evidence, the Supreme Court declined to 
reversal of his conviction for possession of a consider his contention that the evidence was 
controlled substance precursor as a lesser in- insufficient for conviction State v Hopkins, 
eluded offense of operating a methamphet- 1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065 
amine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, 989 P.2d 1065. 
58-37d-6. Legal inference of intent — Illegal possession of 
a controlled substance precursor or clandestine 
laboratory equipment. 
The trier of fact may infer that the defendant intended to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation if the defendant: 
(1) is in illegal possession of a controlled substance precursor; or 
(2) illegally possesses or attempts to illegally possess a controlled 
substance precursor and is in possession of any one of the following pieces 
of equipment: 
(a) glass reaction vessel; 
(b) separatory funnel; 
(c) glass condenser; 
(d) analytical balance; or 
(e) heating mantle. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-6, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 156, § 6. 
58-37d-7. Seizure and forfeiture. 
Chemicals, equipment, supplies, vehicles, aircraft, vessels, and personal and 
real property used in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation are 
subject to seizure and forfeiture under the procedures and substantive protec-
tions of Title 24, Chapter 1, Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37d-7, enacted by L. substituted the language beginning "and sub-
1992, eh. 156, §7; Initiative B, 2000, stantive protections" for "of Section 58-37-13." 
adopted Nov. 7, 2000; 2002, ch. 185, § 36. The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, 
Amendment Notes. — The amendment by updated the statutory reference 
2000 Initiative B, effective March 20, 2001, 
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT 58-37c-3 
Section Section 
58-37c-19.9. Anhydrous ammonia is a pre- pseudoephedrine — Penal-
cursor — Requirements re- ties. 
garding purposes and con- 58-37c-21. Department of Public Safety 
tainers. enforcement authority. 
58-37c-20. Possession of ephedrine or 
58-37c-l. Short title. 
This act shall be known as the "Utah Controlled Substance Precursor Act." 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-l, enacted by L. trolled substance precursors, and enacts 
1992, ch, 155, § 1. present §§ 58-37c-l to 58-37c-10, effective July 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1, 1992. 
1992, ch. 155, §§ 1 repeals former §§ 58-37c-l Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this 
to 58-37c-10, as enacted by L. 1989, ch. 186,
 act
w
 means Laws 1992, ch. 155, which repealed 
§§ 2 to 11 and as last amended by L. 1990, ch. ^ d reenacted this chapter. 
180, §§ 1 to 5, relating to regulation of con-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drugs and C.J.S. — 28 C.J.S. Drugs and Narcotics 
Controlled Substances § 17 et seq. § 117 et seq. 
58-37c-2. Purpose. 
The purpose of this act is to provide for the licensure of regulated distribu-
tors and regulated purchasers engaged in regulated transactions of listed 
controlled substance precursor chemicals as they are identified in the act or 
rules adopted pursuant to the act, to provide for maintaining of records and 
submission of reports with respect to regulated transactions, to provide for 
reasonable and necessary regulation of defined types of transactions, to 
provide that violation of the provisions of this act shall be unlawful and 
unprofessional conduct, and to provide for criminal and administrative actions 
for that conduct. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-2, enacted by L. act" means Laws 1992, ch. 155, which repealed 
1992, ch. 155, § 2. and reenacted this chapter. 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this 
58-37c-3. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-102, as used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory Board 
created in Section 58-37c-4. 
(2) "Controlled substance precursor" includes a chemical reagent and 




(d) D-lysergic acid; 
(e) Ergotamine and its salts; 
(f) Diethyl malonate; 
(g) Malonic acid; 
(h) Ethyl malonate; 
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(i) Barbituric acid; 
(j) Piperidine and its salts; 
(k) N-acetylanthranilic acid and its salts; 
(I) Pyrrolidine; 
(m) Phenylacetic acid and its salts; 






(t) Benzyl cyanide; 
(u) Ergonovine and its salts; 
(v) 3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-propanone; 








(ee) Hydriotic acid; 
(ff) gamma butyrolactone (GBL), including butyrolactone, 1,2 
butanolide, 2-oxanolone, tetrahydro-2-furanone, dihydro-2(3H)-
furanone, and tetramethylene glycol, but not including gamma 
aminobutric acid (GABA); 
(gg) 1,4 butanediol; 
(hh) any salt, isomer, or salt of an isomer of the chemicals listed in 
Subsections (2)(a) through (gg); 
(ii) Crystal iodine; 
(jj) Iodine at concentrations greater than 1.5% by weight in a 
solution or matrix; 
(kk) Red phosphorous, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.7; 
(II) anhydrous ammonia, except as provided in Section 58-37c-19.9; 
(mm) any controlled substance precursor listed under the provi-
sions of the Federal Controlled Substances Act which is designated by 
the director under the emergency listing provisions set forth in 
Section 58-37c-14; and 
(nn) any chemical which is designated by the director under the 
emergency listing provisions set forth in Section 58-37c-14. 
(3) "Deliver," "delivery," "transfer," or "furnish" means the actual, con-
structive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance precursor. 
(4) "Matrix" means something, as a substance, in which something else 
originates, develops, or is contained. 
(5) "Person" means any individual, group of individuals, proprietorship, 
partnership, joint venture, corporation, or organization of any type or 
kind. 
(6) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, podiatric physician, vet-
erinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, phar-
maceutical manufacturer, or other person licensed, registered, or other-
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wise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, 
administer, or use in teaching, or chemical analysis a controlled substance 
in the course of professional practice or research in this state. 
(7) (a) "Regulated distributor" means a person within the state who 
provides, sells, furnishes, transfers, or otherwise supplies a listed 
controlled substance precursor chemical in a regulated transaction. 
(b) "Regulated distributor" does not include any person excluded 
from regulation under this chapter. 
(8) (a) "Regulated purchaser" means any person within the state who 
receives a listed controlled substance precursor chemical in a regu-
lated transaction. 
(b) "Regulated purchaser" does not include any person excluded 
from regulation under this chapter. 
(9) "Regulated transaction" means any actual, constructive or at-
tempted: 
(a) transfer, distribution, delivery, or furnishing by a person within 
the state to another person within or outside of the state of a threshold 
amount of a listed precursor chemical; or 
(b) purchase or acquisition by any means by a person within the 
state from another person within or outside the state of a threshold 
amount of a listed precursor chemical. 
(10) "Retail distributor" means a grocery store, general merchandise 
store, drug store, or other entity or person whose activities as a distributor 
are limited almost exclusively to sales for personal use: 
(a) in both number of sales and volume of sales; and 
(b) either directly to walk-in customers or in face-to-face transac-
tions by direct sales. 
(11) "Threshold amount of a listed precursor chemical" means any 
amount of a controlled substance precursor or a specified amount of a 
controlled substance precursor in a matrix; however, the division may 
exempt from the provisions of this chapter a specific controlled substance 
precursor in a specific amount and in certain types of transactions which 
provisions for exemption shall be defined by the division by rule adopted 
pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(12) "Unlawful conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-501 includes know-
ingly and intentionally: 
(a) engaging in a regulated transaction without first being appro-
priately licensed or exempted from licensure under this chapter; 
(b) acting as a regulated distributor and selling, transferring, or in 
any other way conveying a controlled substance precursor to a person 
within the state who is not appropriately licensed or exempted from 
licensure as a regulated purchaser, or selling, transferring, or other-
wise conveying a controlled substance precursor to a person outside of 
the state and failing to report the transaction as required; 
(c) acting as a regulated purchaser and purchasing or in any other 
way obtaining a controlled substance precursor from a person within 
the state who is not a licensed regulated distributor, or purchasing or 
otherwise obtaining a controlled substance precursor from a person 
outside of the state and failing to report the transaction as required; 
(d) engaging in a regulated transaction and failing to submit 
reports and keep required records of inventories required under the 
provisions of this chapter or rules adopted pursuant to this chapter; 
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(e) making any false statement in any application for license, in 
any record to be kept, or on any report submitted as required under 
this chapter; 
(f) with the intent of causing the evasion of the recordkeeping or 
reporting requirements of this chapter and rules related to this 
chapter, receiving or distributing any listed controlled substance 
precursor chemical in any manner designed so that the making of 
records or filing of reports required under this chapter is not required; 
(g) failing to take immediate steps to comply with licensure, 
reporting, or recordkeeping requirements of this chapter because of 
lack of knowledge of those requirements, upon becoming informed of 
the requirements; 
(h) presenting false or fraudulent identification where or when 
receiving or purchasing a listed controlled substance precursor chem-
ical; 
(i) creating a chemical mixture for the purpose of evading any 
licensure, reporting or recordkeeping requirement of this chapter or 
rules related to this chapter, or receiving a chemical mixture created 
for that purpose; 
(j) if the person is at least 18 years of age, employing, hiring, using, 
persuading, inducing,'enticing, or coercing another person under 18 
years of age to violate any provision of this chapter, or assisting in 
avoiding detection or apprehension for any violation of this chapter by 
any federal, state, or local law enforcement official; and 
(k) obtaining or attempting to obtain or to possess any controlled 
substance precursor or any combination of controlled substance 
precursors knowing or having a reasonable cause to believe that the 
controlled substance precursor is intended to be used in the unlawful 
manufacture of any controlled substance. 
(13) "Unprofessional conduct" as defined in Section 58-1-102 and as 
may be further defined by rule includes the following: 
(a) violation of any provision of this chapter, the Controlled Sub-
stance Act of this state or any other state, or the Federal Controlled 
Substance Act; and 
(b) refusing to allow agents or representatives of the division or 
authorized law enforcement personnel to inspect inventories or con-
trolled substance precursors or records or reports relating to pur-
chases and sales or distribution of controlled substance precursors as 
such records and reports are required under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-3, enacted by L. and (10), redesignating the other subsections 
1992, ch. 155, § 3; 1993, ch. 297, § 183; 1996, accordingly. 
ch. 232, § 11; 1998, ch. 100, § 1; 2000, ch. The 2000 amendment by ch. 271, effective 
271, § 3; 2000, ch. 272, § 1. May 1, 2000, added Subsections (2)(ff) and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend- (2)(gg), redesignating the remaining subsec-
ment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "includes tions accordingly and making related changes 
a chemical reagent and" in Subsection (2); de- The 2000 amendment by ch. 272, effective 
leted "its salts, optical isomers, and salts of May 1, 2000, added Subsections (2Xhh) to 
optical isomers" after 'the controlled substance (2)(jj), redesignating existing Subsections 
precursor" in Subsections (2)(p) to (2)(s); de- (2)(hh) and (2)(ii) as (2)(kk) and (2)(11), and 
leted "optical" before "isomer" twice in Subsec- added "or a specified amount of a controlled 
tion (2)(ff), added Subsection (2)(gg), redesig- substance precursor in a matrix" in Subsection 
nating existing Subsections (2)(gg) and (2)(hh) (11). 
as (2)(hh) and (2)(n), and added Subsections (4) This section is set out as reconciled by the 
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Office of Legislative Research and General (13)(a), is codified primarily as 21 U.S.C.S. 
Counsel. § 801 et seq. 
Federal Law. — The federal Controlled Sub- Cross-References. — Controlled sub-
stances Act, cited in Subsections (2)(mm) and stances, Title 58, Chapter 37. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Lesser included offenses. trolled substance precursor, the defendant was 
Because no special verdict form was used, entitled to reversal of his conviction for posses-
and because it was possible that the jury relied sion of a controlled substance precursor as a 
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a) in reaching its lesser included offense of operating a metham-
verdict, which provision includes all the ele- phetamine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 
ments for conviction of possession of a con- UT 98, 989 P. 2d 1065. 
58-37c-4. Board. 
(1) There is hereby established a Controlled Substance Precursor Advisory 
Board which shall consist of four individuals representing distributors and 
purchasers of controlled substance precursors and one member from the 
general public. 
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Section 
58-1-201. 
(3) The duties and responsibilities of the board shall be in accordance with 
Sections 58-1-202 and 58-1-203. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-4, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 155, § 4; 1993, ch. 297, § 184. 
58-37c-5. Responsibility of Department of Commerce — 
Delegation to the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing — Rulemaking authority 
of the division. 
(1) Responsibility for the enforcement of the licensing and reporting provi-
sions of this chapter shall be with the Department of Commerce. 
(2) The executive director shall delegate specific responsibility within the 
department to the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
(3) The division shall make, adopt, amend, and repeal rules necessary for 
the proper administration and enforcement of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-5, enacted by L. making, Title 63, Chapter 46a 
1992, ch, 155, § 5. Department of Commerce, Title 13, Chapter 
Cross-References. — Administrative rule- 1. 
58-37c-6. Division duties. 
The division shall be responsible for the licensing and reporting provisions of 
this chapter and those duties shall include: 
(1) providing for a system of licensure of regulated distributors and 
regulated purchasers; 
(2) refusing to renew a license or revoking, suspending, restricting, 
placing on probation, issuing a private or public letter of censure or 
reprimand, or imposing other appropriate action against a license; 
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History: C. 1953, 58-37c-18, enacted by L. also enacted a § 58-37c-18; that section has 
1998, ch. 100, § 3; 1999, ch. 21, § 55. been renumbered as § 58-37c-21. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 100 
ment, effective May 3, 1999, substituted "Sec- became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to 
tion 58-37c-10" for "Section 58-37-10" in Sub- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
section (l)(a). Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1998, ch 101 meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
58-37c-19. Possession or sale of crystal iodine. 
(1) Any person licensed to engage in a regulated transaction is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor who, under circumstances not amounting to a violation 
of Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(c), offers to sell, sells, or distributes more than two 
ounces of crystal iodine to another person who is: 
(a) not licensed as a regulated purchaser of crystal iodine; 
(b) not excepted from licensure; or 
(c) not excepted under Subsection (3). 
(2) Any person who is not licensed to engage in regulated transactions and 
not excepted from licensure is guilty of a class A misdemeanor who, under 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 58-37c-3(12)(k) or 
Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a): 
(a) possesses more than two ounces of crystal iodine; or 
(b) offers to sell, sells, or distributes crystal iodine to another. 
(3) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply to: 
(a) a chemistry laboratory maintained by: 
(i) a public or private regularly established secondary school; or 
(ii) a public or private institution of higher education that is 
accredited by a regional or national accrediting agency recognized by 
the United States Department of Education; 
(b) a veterinarian licensed to practice under Title 58, Chapter 28, 
Veterinary Practice Act; or 
(c) a general acute hospital. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-19, enacted by L. Practice Act" for "Veterinarians" in Subsection 
1998, ch. 100, § 4; 2000, ch. 1, § 97. (3)(b). 
Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 1998, ch. 100 
ment, effective May 1, 2000, substituted "Sub- became effective on May 4, 1998, pursuant to 
section 58-37c-3(12)(k)" for "Subsection 58-37c- Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
3(10)(kr in the introductory paragraph of Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
Subsection (2) and substituted "Veterinary meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
58-37c-19.5. Iodine solution greater than 1.5% — Prescrip-
tion or permit required — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section, "iodine matrix" means iodine at concentrations 
greater than 1.5% by weight in a matrix or solution. 
(2) A person may offer to sell, sell, or distribute an iodine matrix only: 
(a) as a prescription drug, pursuant to a prescription issued by a 
veterinarian or physician licensed within the state; or 
(b) to a person who is actively engaged in the legal practice of animal 
husbandry of livestock, as defined in Section 4-1-8. 
(3) Prescriptions issued under this section: 
(a) shall provide for a specified number of refills; 
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(b) a retail distributor, wholesaler, manufacturer, warehouseman, or 
common carrier, or an agent of any of these persons, who possesses 
anhydrous ammonia in the regular course of lawful business activities; 
(c) directly involved in or actively operating a business or other lawful 
activity providing or using anhydrous ammonia for refrigeration applica-
tions; or 
(d) directly involved in or actively operating a lawful business enter-
prise, including an industrial enterprise, that uses anhydrous ammonia in 
the regular course of its business activities. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-19.9, enacted by Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25 
L. 2000, ch. 272, § 4. Cross-References. — Sentencing for misde-
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 272 meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301 
became effective on May 1, 2000, pursuant to 
58-37c-20. Possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine 
— Penalties. 
(1) Any person who is not licensed to engage in regulated transactions and 
not excepted from licensure who, under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection 58-37c-3(12)(k) or Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), possesses 
more than 12 grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, their salts, isomers, or 
salts of isomers, or a combination of any of these substances, is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor. 
(2) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under Subsection (1) that the 
person in possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, or a combination of 
these two substances: 
(i) is a physician, pharmacist, retail distributor, wholesaler, man-
ufacturer, warehouseman, or common carrier, or an agent of any of 
these persons; and 
(ii) possesses the substances in the regular course of lawful busi-
ness activities. 
(b) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an 
affirmative defense under this section as soon as practicable, but not 
later than ten days prior to trial. The court may waive the notice 
requirement in the interest of justice for good cause shown, if the 
prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. 
(ii) The notice shall include the specifics of the asserted defense. 
(iii) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a 
complete defense to the charges. 
(3) This section does not apply to dietary supplements, herbs, or other 
natural products, including concentrates or extracts, which: 
(a) are not otherwise prohibited by law; and 
(b) may contain naturally occurring ephedrine, ephedrine alkaloids, or 
pseudoephedrine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, or a combi-
nation of these substances, that: 
(i) are contained in a matrix of organic material; and 
(ii) do not exceed 15% of the total weight of the natural product. 
History: C. 1953, 58-37c-20, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 2000 amend-




"Possession" The definition of possession does not require that a person be shown to have 
individually possessed a controlled substance precursor. Rather, it is sufficient if it is shown that 
the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the possession of a controlled 
substance precursor with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance 
precursor is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Exhibit G 
INSTRUCTION NO. « ^ P 
Before you can convict the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, of CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count One of the 
Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about March 21, 2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah; 
2. The defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, as a party; 
3. Knowingly or intentionally; 
a. Possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
AND/OR 
b. Conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; and 
4. In doing so possessed a firearm. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, guilty of CLANDESTINE LABORATORY 
PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count One of the information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, not guilty of CLANDESTINE 




Before you can convict the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, of CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two of the 
Information, you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following 
elements of the crime: 
1. That on or about March 21,2001, at County of Davis, State of Utah; 
2. The defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, as a party; 
3. Knowingly or intentionally; 
a. Possessed a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation; 
AND/OR 
b. Conspired with or aided another to engage in a clandestine laboratory 
operation; and 
4. In doing so possessed a firearm. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, guilty of CLANDESTINE LABORATORY 
PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two the information. 
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are 
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant, ROBERT CARL TERRY, not guilty of CLANDESTINE 
LABORATORY PRECURSORS AND/OR EQUIPMENT, as charged in Count Two of the 
Information. 
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